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1. Introduction  
 
Privatization in Serbia has been given a second chance. This time, the government has 
made it clear that it means it. It has set up a ministry for privatization; invited 
international experts to assist in drafting the law on privatization; opted for the case-
by-case approach and sale model; started restructuring big enterprises before selling 
them off; and engaged in a serious advertising campaign to make privatization 
acceptable to the Serbian public. 
 
There are several broad aspects of a privatization policy. The most important one is 
the selection of the best model by which to privatize; that is, the method of sale or 
transfer. The second is the development of financial market institutions enabling the 
trading of shares created by privatization (share funds, investment funds, stock 
market, commission to regulate securities exchange etc.). The third is the transparency 
and the fairness of the process. This paper attempts to assess the coherence of the 
newly developed Serbian privatization model, and how well and how fairly it is being 
applied.  
 
Change was certainly needed. It will be argued in section 3 that the management-
employee buyout model that was deployed in the 1991 and 1997 laws on privatization 
was actually an attempt to stall privatization in Serbia and allow the political elite tied 
to the Socialist party of Serbia and JUL, to grab assets without putting them to the 
right or productive use.  
 
 
2. Privatization Models 
 
The first post-Milosevic Serbian government embraced the sale model for 
privatization. Before explaining this model and its advantages and disadvantages, a 
definition of privatization is in order. John Nellis defines privatization as ‘a transfer of 
ownership such that a majority of the shares or equity in enterprises passes from state 
or public ownership into private hands’ (Nellis 1998: 13). Cheryl Gray says that ‘the 
task [of privatization] is not only to change ownership but to create good corporate 
governance and to further the development of legal norms and supporting institutions 
neede d in full-fledged market economies’ (Gray 1996: 1). On these definitions, the 
major task of privatization is to create real private owners. The existence of real 
owners is essential to ensure the final aim—namely, a good corporate governance that 
will make the firms and the economy work. But corporate governance, especially in 
post-socialist states, is partly dependant on techniques or models of privatization. 
Gray argues that good corporate governance  
 
‘depends to a large extent on the technique used to privatize and the 
distribution of ownership that results. Different types of private owners […] 
all bring different mixtures of both goals and capabilities to the firm they 
own. […] Creating formal ownership is necessary but not sufficient; creating 
effective corporate governance is the more complete task’ (ibid. 3). 
 
There are several ways to privatize. In transition economies the best are:  
a) restitution;  
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b) sale model;  
c) management -employee buyouts;  
d) mass privatization.  
 
Although the list contains or implies four separate approaches, there are basically two 
models that dominate the current privatization policy in East-Central Europe. If 
restitution (i.e., the handing back of assets to pre-socialist owners) is separated out as 
a special case, there remains sale and mass privatization. Privatization through sales 
implies direct sale of enterprises to so-called strategic investors, often foreign 
investors. It was most successfully used in advanced OECD countries such as the UK 
and middle-income mixed economies such as Chile. In the East Central European 
economies, Hungary and Estonia have successfully used this approach. Strategic 
investors tend to be those already in the business, meaning that they have a 
specialized knowledge of the firm they are interested in buying, its real or potential 
markets, and its competitors. The assumption is that such investors will be interested 
in continuing the production, not in shutting down the firm as soon as they buy it.  
 
When considered within the context of East Central Europe, the major disadvantage 
of this model is that it works best where the market environment is well-established. 
Since in new democracies market institutions are far from developed, investors tend 
to be wary and sales tend to be slow. What is more, in infant and undeveloped 
markets—and especially in a country such as Serbia that is depleted by four wars it 
was involved in waging during the 90s—there can be found a limited amount of 
capital. The problem is, therefore, who will invest.  
 
The current assessment is that, in transition countries, privatization through sale is the 
best way to privatize. This is forcefully argued in two papers written by Djankov and 
Murrell (2000; 2002). The papers show that the move from state to private ownership 
did result in greater amount of restructuring, but it also showed that the countries that 
deployed any type of mass privatization score more poorly than the countries that 
deployed direct sale method regarding the restructuring of the enterprises. However, 
wherever sale approach was embraced (except for East Germany), it was combined 
with other approaches. It is important to mention two other models and their 
advantages, because the prescriptive part will refer to these in order to overcome the 
difficulties of the current strategy. 
 
The second key variant of mass privatization is management-employee buyout 
(MEBO). It implies a giveaway or a sale, often at steeply discounted prices, of all or 
part of the company to the people who work inside the company, be they managers or 
employees (Gray 1996: 14). This is why this approach is dubbed ‘insider’ model. 
Insider model, as the dominant one, was tried in Croatia, Georgia, Russia, Slovenia, 
Romania, Ukraine, Armenia, Uzbekistan, Albania, and Yugoslavia prior to 2001. T his 
model is always a popular one, enables fast and easy implementation. It is more 
equitable bur rather inefficient (ibid. 14-15). However, in all mentioned countries, bar 
Slovenia, where it was applied as the dominant model, it failed in creating real 
owners. Transition Report published by the European bank for reconstruction and 
development in 1999 ranks these countries at the bottom of the list of most successful 
privatization policies. This suggests that insider model can be said to be, at best, a 
good substitution if the main model becomes too slow. This is why it came as a 
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supplement to sale model in Hungary in 1993 in order to speed up privatization 
process. 
 
Voucher privatization is a model that differs from both sale and manager -employee 
buyouts. It sees all citizens (not only workers) as equally entitled to the shares of 
firms. Gray writes that  
 
‘Vouchers are given or sold at very low prices to domestic citizens, thereby 
eliminating the shortage of domestic capital, which is the core problem with 
the sale approach. […] If well-designed, voucher privatization can overcome 
many of the problems with the various sales approaches, most notably the 
perceived unfairness, the shortage of domestic capital, and the difficulty of 
placing monetary values on state assets’ (ibid. 20).  
 
The problem with this type of privatization is that it, like the MEBO, does not resolve 
the problem of ‘real’ owners and corporate governance.  
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Table 1 shows the advantages and disadvantages of each model. 
 
   Objective   
 Better 
corporate 
governance 
Speed and 
feasibility 
Better 
access to 
capital and 
skills 
More 
government 
revenue 
Greater 
fairness 
Method      
Sale + - + + - 
MEBO - + - - - 
Voucher ? + ? - + 
Spontaneous  ? ? - - - 
Table 1 (Source: World Development Report 1996 , p. 52.) 
 
Privatization is always a matter of politics, not simply economics. Economists may be 
able to design the best privatization model from the point of view of stimulating 
efficiency, but which model will be picked out for a certain context will depend on the 
views and power of the various stakeholders involved. At the end, it is always up to 
politicians to decide. Mass privatization is initially more popular politically than 
conventional sales techniques because it implies a greater inclusion of the population. 
In countries where those inside the firm had very little influence over what to do with 
state property, like in Germany or the Czech Republic, the government could opt for a 
top-down privatization. In countries where workers or managers had more influence, 
like in Russia or Poland, this was unfeasible. Likewise, the selection of models largely 
depends what kind of problem a specific country is faced with. The Czech Republic 
did not have any foreign debt when the Berlin Wall fell. It was not in acute need of 
resources for debt repayment, so it could afford a mass privatization program that 
gave away the assets. Countries such as Hungary, that had a very large and pressing 
foreign debt, had to sell the assets to raise money to pay it off. 
 
As it stands, the sale model opens up the possibility for establishing concentrated 
ownership. When ownership is concentrated, firms tend to restructure faster and 
perform better. Concentrated ownership enables the so-called deep restructuring of 
firms which is the development of new production lines, identification of the new 
markets, and implementation of new management techniques and business strategies. 
Only deep restructuring can create new jobs. In contrast, types of mass privatization 
(voucher or MEBO) usua lly result in dispersed ownership. In this approach, most 
firms start off being owned mainly by both insiders and some outsiders but without 
strong dominant shareholder. Dispersed ownership can have a negative impact on 
corporate governance, because it leads to the so-called defensive or reactive 
restructuring, meaning downsizing in production, workforce and capacity associated 
with the loss of market (Transition Report 1999 , p. 165). As mentioned, there is now 
a considerable empirical evidence showing that various types mass privatization has 
not led to strong restructuring and recovery (Djankov and Murrell 2000; 2002). 
 
Effective corporate governance exists when owners are motivated to use resources 
efficiently. In addition, owners must be equipped with capabilities to monitor what 
managers do and make them to act in firm’s best interest (World Development Report 
1996, p. 52). 
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One cannot dispute that privatization contributes in most cases to efficiency gains, but 
for it to be overall success it must do more than address efficiency issues. In the 
Czech Republic and Russia privatization was fast, but private ownership without 
appropriate governance rules and safeguards was created. The safest conclusion is 
perhaps that privatization must be neither too fast, nor too slow. Where it was too fast 
(as in Russia), it quickly created a mass private owners but the owners were not real, 
that is, competent to run the firms productively. Where it was too slow, (as in 
Bulgaria, Romania, and the Ukraine in the early 1990s, and Belarus up to today), it 
resulted in almost no privatization at all (Gray 1996: 7). 
 
 
3. Privatization in Serbia before June 29, 2001 
 
First efforts at privatization in Yugoslavia began in 1990, but quickly arrived on a 
bumpy road. The Federal government led by Ante Markovic passed in 1988 Law on 
Enteprises, then in 1989 Act on financial Operations and Laws on Social Capital. The 
laws enabled firms’s reoragnization, their insolvency and brankruptcy. It also 
permited Emplyee Assenblies of the firms to sell the wished amount of enterprise’s 
capital. The shares of the enterprise were sold at a 30% discount a rate to the present 
and former employees of the company. For each year of the employment the workers 
were given 1% discount up to a maximum of 70% of the nominal value of the shares 
(Uvalic 2001: 2) The hopes in the successful beginning of privatization, just like the 
hopes in economic reforms in general, were squashed by the conservative Milosevic 
government and the political conflict that w as speeding up in the beginning of 1990 
when the first multiparty elections were held in all six republics. The breakup of the 
country was inevitable and with it the breakdown of the announced economic reform 
in SFR Yugoslavia. 
 
The Federal laws from 1989 continued to have some effects during the fisrt half of the 
1990s. The federal privatization law was followed by a law regulating privatization in 
Serbia. In 1991, the Serbian parliament adopted the Law on conditions and procedures 
to transform collective property into other forms of property (Sluzbeni glasnik 
Republike Srbije, no. 48/91, 75/91, 48/94, 51/94). This law permitted only the 
transformation of so-called collective property (drustvena svojina ), forbidding the 
transformation of state -owned property. The transformation did not cover public or 
collective enterprises that were owned by the state or local authorities. Privatization 
was not mandatory.  
 
Between 1989 and 1994 some 60% of Serbian firms were privatized. But since it was 
an insider privatization, it did not do anything to change the corporate governance 
within the firms. Firms essentially continued to behave the same, accummulating 
arrears, receiving direct subsidies and soft credits. ‘Banks often preferred to write 
loans off rather than put firms into bakruptcy; there was little inventive to foreclose on 
loans, since bankruptcy and liquidation procedures were heavily weigted in favor of 
the indebtor’ (OECD 2002: 57). On top of all this, there came the 1990 Serbian 
constitutution that mandated the equality of all types of ownership. 
 
 10 
Due to huge inflation that culminated in December 1993, and the failure to re-value 
the assets to account for this inflation, the privatization carried out between 1990-
1993 resulted in the sale of firms for unreasonably low prices. This is why in 1994 the 
Serbian parliament, in a move pushed for by the Democratic party, annuled the results 
of privatization by amending the 1991 Privatization law. As early as 1994, the 
Agency for privatization revised most of the dea ls made between 1991-1993, and 
reversed the results of the 1991 privatization law. The reevaluation was so-called ex 
post revaluation of the share which were privatizated prior to 1993. It meant that all 
the shares which were extremely cheap in the inflatory 1993, suddenly became very 
expensive. This forced most of the shareholders to give up on the subscribed shares 
due to their high price (Uvalic 2001: 2). As a result, less than 10% remained privately 
owned.  
 
During 1995, when Dragoslav Avramovic was the governor of the Yugoslav national 
bank, there was debate whether privatization should be made obligatory. In 1996, the 
Federal parliament passes a new privatization law that delineates a framework for the 
two republics, stating that privatization must rema in voluntary. This was followed by 
a second Law on Property transformation adopted by the Serbian parliament in 1997 
(Sluzbeni Glasnik RS , no. 32/97). The 1997 law saw insiders (workers and pensioners 
who were or are employed by firms) as the only eligible beneficiaries of privatization. 
It gave away up to 60% of the total share with no strings attached. One problem was, 
however, that not too many employed got the full 60% because the law attached the 
percentage of the shares to the years spent in the firm (articles 11-12). The usual 
outcome was that workers and the director got about 20-30%, whereas the rest was 
transferred to a share fund managed by the state. In practice, the share fund managers 
took no interest in governing the firm at all, whereas the workers were under the 
threat of the director of the firm to vote the way he suggested. The proportion of the 
shares given out to the employees was not high enough, and the menagers could 
happily retain the control in the privatized companies. This also created the 
phenomenon known as ‘tunneling’, although in much smaller extent than in the Czech 
Republic. 
 
As a result, the restructuring of corporate governance under the 1997 law never 
occurred. This Serbian version of a MEBO simply did not motivate management and 
workers to restructure. If restructuring implies downsizing, as it does, workers owning 
shares are rarely interested in restructuring the enterprise. In addition, the most 
damaging limitation was that, due to the insider character of the privatization, foreign 
investors were not allowed to buy shares. Moreover, privatization was not obligatory; 
insiders could initiate the process if they wished but they were not required to do so. 
 
One novelty of the 1997 law was that, although preferring MEBO model, it did 
foresee special tender procedure for 75 enterprises that were seen as potentially 
lucrative. The 49% of the shares of the Serbian Telecom were sold by this law, 
altough the government had to amend the Law on Foreign Investment, for this Law 
saw the Telekom as a strategic company that cannot be sold to foreign investors. 
 
Once again, and not surprisingly, the results were less than hoped for, and the 
implementation of the 1997 law was terminated in February 2001 when the Serbian 
parliament amended the law (Sluzbeni Glasnik RS, no. 10/01), and paused the process 
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for six months, the time-limit within which a new law on privatization was intended 
to be passed.  
 
At the beginning of 1997, a modest share of collective capital had been privatized, 
whereas state ownership remained untouched. In total, under the 1997 law on 
privatization, only 10% of the capital was privatized by the end of 2000. The share of 
this 10% in the GDP was around 2%. 
 
Results of privatization in Serbia prior to 2001. 
 Number of enterprises 
Started privatization 428 
Finished in first round 284 
Finished in second round 246 
Privatized 18 
Table 2 (Source: Report from the Direction for the Assessment of Capital.) 
 
[But see Table 25 from OECD, p. 104, from Uvalic 2001] 
 
Only smaller firms were privatized under the 1997 law. The sum of the emitted shares 
was estimated at 12 billion dinars (€200 million). The only big enterprise that was 
privatized was Telekom Srbija, in which 49% of shares were sold to the Greece STET 
and the Italian OTI. All in all, privatization policy prior to 2001 was flawed in that: a) 
it did not really make privatization possible; b) the few enterprises that went through 
the process did not become more efficient; and c) it was not just and fair (Mijatovic 
2000: 7). 
 
The insider method that was dominant in all three laws had basically neither effect on 
the Serbian enteprise sector nor at the Serbian economy in general. The insider 
privatization ‘has mainly resulted in widespread ownership by insider who today, 
given enormous losses of alarge part of the economy, most frequently own worthless 
shares in highly undercapitalised enterprises’ (Uvalic 2001: 6) Besides, state owned 
enteprises become more and more to be seen as a source of political power due to the 
very close ties between economics and politics. It was estimated that leading 
politicians were directors of about 30 largest companies. A political party, called JUL 
headed by Milosevic’s wife Mira Markovic, started to gather such people. One of the 
most important goals of any future privatization policy that had to break with the past 
was to destroy this economic-political link. 
 
 
4. The Privatization Law of June 29, 2001 
 
The new privatization law, enacted on June 29, 2001, gave up on the insider model 
and the practice permitted by the previous law. Privatization was made obligatory, 
and the state was given a greater role in ensuring the certainty of the process. As will 
be seen, foreign ownership was encouraged, and the governement decided to let the 
firms that started privatization under the 1997 law finish the process. 
 
The Serbian parliament adopted an extensive set of laws and measures to regulate the 
privatization process. 
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o The privatization law (June 29, 2001; Sluzbeni glasnik Republike Srbije (SG 
RS); no. 38/01); 
o The privatization agency law (June 29, 2001; SG RS, no. 38/01); 
o The share fund law (June 29, 2001; SG RS, no. 38/01); 
o The ordinance concerning tender sale of capital and assets (July 17, 2001; SG 
RS , no. 45/01); 
o The ordinance concerning auctio n sale of capital and assets (July 17, 2001; SG 
RS , no. 45/01) (amended on August 2, 2002; SG RS, no. 45/02); 
o The ordinance concerning the methodology for assessment of value of capital 
and assets (July 17, 2001; SG RS , no. 45/01) (amended on August 2, 2002; SG 
RS , no. 45/02); 
o The rulebook concerning the content and methods for running the privatization 
register (August 29, 2001; SG RS  no. 52/01); 
o The rulebook concerning the content and methods for running the temporary 
register (August 29, 2001; SG RS  no. 2/01); 
o The rulebook concerning the level of cost of privatization before the Agency 
for privatization incurred by enterprises and other legal persons (September 
28, 2001; SG RS  no. 57/01); 
o The rulebook concerning the prospectus form (July 19, 2001; SG RS  no. 
44/01). 
o The law on amanding the privatization law (February 28, 2003; SG RS  no. 
18/03) 
 
The Law on Privatization of June 29, 2001 tries from the very beginning to avoid the 
trap of the past. Articles 1 and 3 set forth that both collective and state -owned 
property must be transformed. Article 2 lays out four basic principles of privatization:  
a) creating conditions for development of economy and social stability;  
b) transparency of the process;  
c) flexibility;  
d) letting the market form the prices of firms.  
 
It can be seen that that privatization is not the goal in itself, but that the objective is 
rather to create the basic institutions of a market economy. The Law aims at making 
the privatization process transparent, meaning that the public has the right to be timely 
informed what firms are up for privatization, who buys them, and if the procedures for 
privatization were carried out according to the law. Finally, point d) insists that firms 
be sold under prices formed by the markets, not determined by the administration.  
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These are the major institutions to implement the privatization policy are: The 
ministry for privatization, the privatization agency, the share fund, and the 
contemporary register (which is supposed in time to turn into a regular pr ivatization 
register). The agency forms commissions that handle specific tender and auction 
sales. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Institutional structure of the privatization policy. 
Ministry for privatization 
Agency for privatization 
Tender 
commission 
Auction commission 
Enterprise on 
tender sale 
Enterprise on auction 
Center for tenders
  
Center for firm 
restructuring 
Center for auction 
Center for legal 
matters 
Center for capital 
markets 
Share fund Contemporary register  Privatization register 
The Serbian government 
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Article 9 postulates two models of privatization: sale of capital and transfer of capital 
with no compensation (Table 3). Sale can be divided into two types, public tenders 
and public auctions, whereas assets can be transferred to workers and citizens. 
 
Models of privatization according to the June 29 Law. 
1. Sale of capital 2. Transfer of capital with no 
compensation 
Methods of sale  Methods of transfer 
1) Public tender 1) Transfer of shares to employees 
2) Public auction 2) Transfer of shares to citizens  
Table 3  
 
The general features of sale approach is already explained in section 3. The new law, 
which adopts a sale model, gives priority to outsiders to buy firms. The goal is not just 
to sell firms, but to sell them to so-called strategic partners who will continue to 
produce, and not strip the assets or shut the firm down soon after they move in. 
Strategic partners are expected to bring skills and money to the firm, to deploy 
resources more rationally, insist and establish profit-based orientation of the firm, 
thereby creating environment for a market economy to thrive, which in turn will lead 
to the opening of new working places.  
 
Four key aspects for tender sale are: 
 
a) offered price;  
b) social program;  
c) the level of new investments in the firm; 
d) environmental program. 
 
The government decided to pursue manifold goals with the privatiation policy. Hence, 
price is not the only criteria by which firms are sold. Neither is this the most relevant 
criterion. Level of investments and social program also play role in determining the 
final decision.  
 
Auction sales are carried out at the designated places where firms are sold by public 
bidding. Auctions (articles 34-40) differs from tender sale in having only one 
specified condition as to who can buy the firm. Whereas in tender sale there are 
several conditions that determine who is the buyer, the sole condition that determines 
the outcome of the auction is the price—whoever bids the highest price takes away 
what is up for sale. As opposed to a tender where the Agency organizes and carries 
out the whole process, an auction is only organized by the Agency, and the 
implementation is handled by a commission set up by the Agency. 
 
Although article 12 stipulates that buyers in auctions can be subjects from the inside 
but also from the outside of the company, the very same article makes it clear that 
Yugoslav citizens can buy capital or assets only after submitting proofs on not having 
obligations that stem from the Extra profit law (Sluzbeni Glasnik  RS ; June 22, 2001; 
no. 36/01). The key motivation for this proviso was political. It was supposed to block 
the people who benefited from close ties with Milosevic from turning their illegally 
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obtained wealth into legitimate private property by laundering their assets on public 
auctions.  
 
Articles 42-45 state that up to 30% of the assets of each firm may be transferred to 
workers, ex-workers (pensioners), and citizens. The worker obtains up to €200 in 
shares for each working year. The total eligible years of service is 35, which makes all 
in all €7,000 worth of shares free of charge.  
 
The two models of privatization prescribed by the June 29 law are by no means equal 
in weight. The sale model dominates the transfer model. Sale is the model the 
government prefers, meaning that the bulk of shares in enterprises must be sold. It is 
postulated that up to 70% of the capital must be sold on either tender or auction, 
whereas the remaining 30% will be transferred to employees or citizens but only upon 
the completion of the sale of the 70% (articles 42-54). More importantly, although the 
Law is not explicit on this, the government made it clear that tender will be employed 
for big and strategic firms, whose number most likely does not exceed 200. Smaller 
and medium-size enterprises, whose number is estimate d at about 7,000, are planned 
to be sold in public auctions. 
 
The tender process is of crucial importance for Serbian privatization, for the biggest, 
large value firms, employing the majority of the workforce will be sold by this 
method. Tenders are organized and carried out by the Agency for privatization. The 
procedure covers: preparation for sale, public advertising, accepting the bids, 
assessment of the bids, closing contracts, and other things (Art. 27). The Agency is in 
charge of tender and auction procedure, but article 29 says that the minister of 
privatization forms a commission in charge of overseeing the tender procedure. The 
commission has three members that are appointed by the government, one member 
from the local community, and one member from the firm itself. For every tender sale 
the government and the Agency form a separate tender commission. The bidder must 
pay a deposit in order to be eligible to bid (art 30). The minister for privatization sets 
the sum of the deposit.  
 
The Law also specifies how the revenues from privatization will be distributed. 75% 
goes directly to the Serbian budget, 5% to the restutution fund, 10% to the pension 
fund and another 10% to the infrastructure fund (Art. 61). 
 
The privatization agency law sets out the tasks of the agency. The Agency is the key 
body ‘that promotes, initiates, carries out and controls the privatization process 
according to the law’ (art. 1). Being in charge of implementation, the Agency is the 
body that indicates the separation between privatization policy and its 
implementation. This implies analysis of the financial situation, presentation and 
advertising of the firms to be privatized, decisions by which consulting and legal 
advising firms are hired, and so on. The main resources for the funding and working 
of Agency are provided by the state budget and incomes from privatization 
transactions (art. 5). The Agency also specifies the method by which the firm will be 
privatized. It organizes the tender and auction procedure and, in the case of tender 
sale, suggests to the tender commission which offer is the best one (art. 9), but it the 
tender commission that takes the final decision whom the firm is sold. The Agency is 
also in charge of informing the public about the nature and progress of privatization.  
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‘The Agency is separated from the ministry by a Chinese Wall,’ as the minister of 
privatization likes to say. This is important because it indicates that, at least formally, 
the possibility for corruption is lessened. The Agency has even a separate bank 
account, meaning that, unlike the ministry, it is fully financed from sales revenues. 
The Agency is divided up in five centers: center for tenders, center for auctions, 
center for restructuring, center for legal matters, and center for capital markets. 
 
The share fund is another important body in the institutional structure of privatization 
policy. Its activities are defined by articles 67-74 of the privatization law and by the 
Share fund law. The major activity of the fund is to manage and sell the shares that 
remained undistributed by the privatization process set by the previous law. The 1997 
stated that the shares of a firm may be given away in two rounds. The firms that 
carried out the first round of privatization under the 1997 law do not go into the 
second round, but transfer all remaining shares to the share fund. Also, all the shares 
that were not distributed in the second round are transferred to the fund. The share 
fund either sells the shares that are transferred to it, or it registers them with the 
privatization register. The share fund is obliged to sell these shares only upon the 
request of the Agency for privatization but this sale has to be based on market value 
of the shares and conducted on stock market. The fund is obliged to abide by the 
principle of indiscriminacy and publicity, providing access to all interested parties of 
all relevant information. The fund has to sell off all shares in its portfolio within six 
years from the date of the law. The shares can be sold on public auction but also on 
the stock market via brokers (art. 9 of the Share fund law). 
 
The government and the Agency also decided to restructure certain enterprises it self 
before the sale. There are 44 enterprises in thius group that encompass some 150-
200,000 workers. The criteria to get into this group are that the firm must be large, has 
significant debt, and regionally important. 
 
 
5. The Reality of Privatization in Serbia  
 
More than one year after the privatization law has come into force and the process 
began, privatization in Serbia has not started to yield the results it was supposed to. Of 
course, the process is still young, private property is still not prevalent; there is little 
evidence of any substantial restructuring in corporate governance or of the better 
performance of privatized companies; and growth is still not picking up. An alleged 
disadvantage of privatization by direct sale is that it is slow, whereas various types of 
mass privatization can be done faster. Moreover, there have been a number of 
different views as to when to start privatization, or whether privatization is needed at 
all in the first years of transition. One approach emphasizes the need for cautious but 
immediate privatization. A countering approach, espoused by Joseph S tiglitz (1999), 
stresses that macroeconomic stabilization accompanied by market-supporting 
institutions have to be attained and secured first. Privatization should take place after 
these institutions are functioning in some minimal manner.  
 
Be that as it may, the Serbian government decided to start privatization program 
parallely with building necessary institutions for its implementation. On the other 
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hand, the macroeconomic situation in the beginning of 2001 was relatively favorable 
for starting privatization. Macroeconomic stabilization was quickly achieved, 
meaning that the fundamental requirements for a successful privatization had already 
existed before it started off in July 2001. Some steps aiming at macroeconomic 
stabilization were carried out already by the end of 2000, but the real stabilization 
began after the new Serbian government was voted in on January 25, 2001. The 
Serbian government was not able to increase industrial production in 2001, but 
production did not drop, meaning that annual production growth loss in 2001 was 0%. 
In 2002, however, industrial production growth rate was 1.7%. 
 
Industrial production; month-to-month in per centages 
 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
2001 -7.4 2.1 11.6 -3.3 -0.8 1.8 -9.7 4.0 5.7 10.4 -2.8 -1.0 
2002 -15.8 3.8 12.7 -2.6 -3.5 -0.6 -2.8 -2.3 6.5   -4.5 
Table 4. (Source: G17 Economic Review) 
 
Before the election of September 24, 2000, the average annual rate of inflation was 
112%. Inflation was down already by the end of 2000. Average inflation in 2001 was 
40.7%. Althought the projected inflation rate for 2002 is 20%, in the end of 2002, it 
was 14.8%. 
 
Inflation. Month-to-month per cent changes  
 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
2001 3.2 3.3 0.9 9.3 1.9 3.9 2.4 2.7 1.4 2.6 1.6  
2002 0.6 1.0 0.8 0.9 0.4 0.5 4.1 0.4 0.9   0.8 
Table 5. (Source: G17 Economic Review) 
 
Average wages have also risen very quickly. But the rise was more nominal than real. 
In October 2000, the average wage was around $40. Already at the end of 2001, it 
was $122.5. The increase of real average wages in 2002 was 30.2%, and average 
nominal wage in December 2002 was $169. 
 
Average monthly wages in YU dinars and US dollars 
2001 Jan Feb Mar Apr May  Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
YuD 3821 4087 4262 4531 4497 5530 6268 6800 6900 7408 7729 8456 
USD 55.3 59.2 61.8 65.6 65.1 80.1 90.8 98.5 100 107.3 112.0 122.5 
2002 Jan Feb Mar Apr May  Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
YuD 7435 7924 8204 8793  8993 9342     11555 
USD  107.7 114.8 118.8 127.4  130.3 135.3     169 
Table 6. (Source: G17 Economic Review.) 
 
Nominal and real increase of monthly wages. (Month-to-month) 
  Jan  Feb Mar Apr May  Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
2001 Nom. n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 13.35 8.5 1.5 7.4 4.3 9.4 
2001 Real n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 11.3 5.4 -0.3 4.3 3.6 9.1 
  Jan  Feb Mar Apr May  Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
2002 Nom. -12.1 6.6 3.5 6.5 -1.2 4.2 3.9 6.4    12.3 
2002 Real -11.6 5.3 2.4 5.9 -1.4 3.7 -0.4 6.3    12.5 
Table 7. (Source: G17 Economic Review) 
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The most troublesome macroeconomic indicator in Serbia is the high rate of 
unemployment. It was practically stable in 2001, but in December 2002, it reached 
30.7%. 
 
Unemployment rate (as per cent of labor force) 
 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
2001 26.2 26.6 26.8 26.8 26.7 26.7 27.0 27.2 27.0 27.1 27.2 27.3 
2002 27.7 27.9 27.7 27.9 27.9 28.4 28.9 30.1    30.7 
Table 8. (Source: G17 Economic Review.) 
 
This run of figures was presented here for two reasons. First, it is important to show in 
what kind of macroeconomic environment privatization process in Serbia takes place. 
The economic situation is relatively stabile, although not particularly cheerful. 
Second, the figures indicate if privatization has started to affect the restructuring of 
the Serbian enterprises, which is the f inal objective of any privatization policy. As 
may be seen from the figures, this argument still cannot be made. With a high rate of 
unemployment, low average salaries, and zero or tiny industrial growth more than one 
year after the privatization process was kicked off, it can be claimed that the 
privatization policy of the Serbian government did not yield the results it was 
supposed to.  
 
This can be attributed to both objective obstacles and policy flaws. The first step in 
laying a good foundation for privatization is to impose financial discipline (“hard 
budget constraints”) and ensure competition. Serbian firms were accustomed to using 
so-called soft credits, usually doled out by the Development fund administered by the 
Serbian government and financed from the Serbian budget. Soft credits were easy to 
get, but it was almost easier not to repay or to return them under silly conditions. This 
allowed many socialist enterprises to survive throughout the 90s, but this is also what 
allowed them to avoid restructuring and privatization under the 1997 privatization 
law. In 2001, the Serbian government abolished the institution of soft credit, which 
forced some firms to go out of business. But it retained the policy of forgiving the 
debts or paying interest rates on time of medium-size firms, and covering the losses of 
large infrastructural and energy enterprises such as electricity or railway systems that 
still gobble up huge amounts of the Serbian budget. So far, the government did not 
tackle the structure of these big infrastructural enterprises. The Serbian electric 
company is, for example, overstaffed with about 67,000 people employed, which is 
approximately twice the number of the employed it should have. It is especially 
worrisome that along with the increase in the price of electricity, business losses of 
this company are also increasing. For instance, in 2000, the KwH of electric energy 
cost $0.85 cents, and the total loss for 2000 was $121 million. In 2001, the price rose 
to $1.41 c per KwH, whereas the loss was $202 million. In July 2002, the price went 
up to $3 c, but the projected loss rose to $377 million. The government still has no 
general plan what to do with the biggest public enterprises. 
 
Since the major problem that any reform government faces are the so-called socialist 
giants—which are the large loss-makers, are incapable of paying debts, and are 
severely overstaffed—the government has engaged in targeted top-down programs to 
restructure some enterprises prior to their privatization. Since it is expected that no 
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investor will buy a firm that calls for immediate massive lay offs, the government 
took on this dirty but essential job. The process works as follows: the privatization 
agency analyzes firms in its portfolio and decides whether the firm has first to be 
restructured or goes directly to tender or auction. If restructuring is necessary, the 
government comes up with a special program for each firm. The general idea of 
restructuring is to make enterprises lean and clean for sale not to pump more 
investment money into losing proportions.  
 
The Agency for privatization defined three critical criteria for assessing whether a 
company can be included in the program: a) organizational structure; b) large number 
of employees; c) heavy indebtedness. Applying these criteria, the Agency divided 
companies in three groups. The first consists of six companies whose poor condition 
might cause dangerous social problems. The second consists of 20 companies that 
could be restructured in relatively short time. The third group is made up by a dozen 
companies that are perhaps most difficult to restructure. In August 2002, 26 big 
enterprises was in the process of restructuring, and by the end of the year, a total of 44 
firms are expected to be in the process. 
 
It must be stressed that this kind of restructuring of firms has to be done sooner or 
later. Most of the firms have already been downsized but still look rather unattractive 
for the potential investors. In spring 2002, after the first round of restructuring of the 
Zastava factory has been done, the government could not sell Zastava even for $1. 
This means that the very same firms will need another round of restructuring, which 
will additionally burden the government that hardly survived the costs of first round 
restructuring.  
 
The Serbian government, especially the ministry for privatization, was rather sanguine 
about the start of privatization process. It began by advertising privatization to foreign 
donors, and restructuring enterprises for sale. However, the result of the first year of 
privatization was far from cheerful. The government spent considerable energy on 
arranging the documentation and procedures for privatization but it did not succeed in 
actually privatizing much. The number of firms awaiting privatization (Table 9) vastly 
exceeded the number of firms that were privatized. 
 
Enterprises ready to be privatized in May 2002. 
 Firms ready for 
privatization 
Number of 
employees 
Book value on 
Dec. 31, 2000 in € 
000 
Total 285 96,522 603,787 
Tenders 63 53,492 343,301 
Auctions 222 43,030 260,485 
Table 9. (Source: Privatization in Serbia, no. 4, May 2002, p. 5.) 
 
At the time of finishing this draft (October 2002) five firms (out of 200) had been 
privatized by tender, and 39 (out of 7,000) by auction sales. Table 10 shows the total 
of the privatized firms, whereas Tables 11 shows the details for each tender sale. 
 
Tender and auction sales: Total result by mid-March 2003. 
 Number of Number of Revenues from sales in 
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enterprises employees million € 
Auctions 385  97 
Tender 12  210 
Total 397  307 
Table 10.  
 
Discouraged by the slow rate of the auction sales, the Serbian government on July 3, 
2002 announced it would ease the conditions for auction sale. The changes took place 
in the form of two ordinances of August 1, 2002. (Ordinance concerning amendments 
of Ordinance concerning the sale of capital on public auction, SG RS , no. 45/02; 
Ordinance concerning amendments of the Ordinance concerning the methodology for 
assessment of value of capital and assets, SG RS  no. 45/02). The major change 
regarded the method for assessing the value of the company. The ordinance 
introduced a corrected book value for assessing the value of the firm. The reason for 
this was that the initial prices on auction sales turned out to be too high. Take for 
example ‘Ribotex.’ At the first attempt to sale, the initial value was € ½ million set by 
the Agency. The auction failed to attract bidders. When the corrected book value 
method was applied, the initial price was set at €200,000, and at the end of auction, it 
was sold for €491,000. Too high initial price are a common problem in privatization 
programs around the world, especially in transition countries. Reasonable initial 
prices are essential for auction sales to succeed.  
 
There were also some changes regarding bidding and price. The so-called English 
auction (also called ‘open outcry’ or ascending bid) remained to be the only type of 
auction, while the Dutch auction is abandoned. The bidding now starts from 80% of 
the estimated price, and goes higher. The government also announced it would form a 
special fund with €100-150 million from which potential domestic buyers can borrow 
the money to bid on auction. All this, the government expected, would speed up the 
process of auction sales, that from July 21, 2002 were supposed to be taking place on 
a weekly basis. 
 
* * * 
 
One of the most painful task with a privatization policy is whether it brings about the 
required changes in corporate governance. Privatization was mainly used as a method 
to retain political control, not to enhance enteprises’ performace. One could say that 
political reasons have prevalently determined the fate of the Serbian enterprises. Yet, 
one could also say that these political reasons had a concrete form that enabled this 
political control. Problems of corporate governance was mainly due to the fact that 
social property and accompanied features were still present with in the Serbian 
economy. Owners could neitehr sell the property nor appropriate procedeeds from 
sales. ‘Property rights remained ambiguous, non-individual, divided among theree 
collective agents—employed workers, the enterprise, and the state.’ (Uvalic 2001: 
10). Moreover, the insider model in Serbia showed only disadvantages of the MEBO. 
Although there are countries where MEBO worked fine (Slovenia), in the Serbian 
context it was a disaster. Wherever it could create specific problems, it did. Workers 
tend to pay high salaries at the expense of new investments and did not care for 
restructuring, which confirms that MEBO is not compatible with rational economic 
behaviour in Serbian context. 
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Changes in corporate governance did not occur prior to 2001 for several reasos. Social 
property was still here with the ambigous effects on corporate governance. ‘Fifty 
years of self-menagements and socialism have left such deep traces that decision-
making practices and working habits seem to have changed little’ (Uvalic 2001: 15). 
b) There is no clear link between owensrship form and mechanism of corporate 
governance. This is supposed to be changed by the new privatization policy. This is 
perhaps the most important novelty of the new privatization policy. According to it, 
the insider model is abandoned and the government tends now to concertrate 
ownership as much as it can by giving 70% to single owner. 
 
One of the most problematic points in the Serbian government’s privatization policy 
is related to the understanding of what the goal of privatization policy is. This is 
essentially related to why the government picked out the model it did. A model is 
selected because it helps achieve broader policy objectives. Consider the examples of 
the Czech Republic or Hungary. One of the reasons why the Klaus government opted 
for the voucher model was Klaus’s ambition to win the next parliamentary elections. 
Vouchers are distributed to everyone, and their distribution is, at the outset, usually 
very popular politically. The economic upshot of a voucher privatization may be 
inefficient (as it turned out to be in the Czech Republic), but it is unmistakably fair.  
 
On the other hand, Hungary resorted to a sale model, just like Serbia. The rationale 
for this decision was to fill in the budget and to attract good owners. As opposed to 
the Czech Republic which in the time of the fall of the Berlin Wall did not have the 
problem with foreign debt, Hungary’s foreign debt was huge. Privatization was 
partially meant to solve the Hungarian problem of retiring foreign debt. The 
Hungarian case is instructive for the Serbian case since the reasons that are driving the 
privatization policy in both cases are the same: Revenues from priva tization are meant 
to be used up for paying off foreign debts, or to fill in the budget. 
 
Servicing the foreign debt needs not be the sole objective of a privatization policy. 
Government can have some other objective to achieve with privatization policy. For 
example, the objective of the government can be to ensure allocative efficiency of 
resources. As said in section 2, one of the general objectives of privatization is to 
ensure that ownership gets into the hands of real owners. If the new owners are real, 
they will make the best out of it, thereby increasing production. The third goal might 
be related to stabilization. The money could be used to fill in the gaps in the budget, 
which makes printing of money an unnecessary activity. Privatization may serve 
manifold purposes, but it is essential that the government ranks in priority the 
objectives it intends to accomplish with the privatization policy. The problem with the 
Serbian government is that it tries to simultaneously accomplish manifold objectives 
with a single privatization policy. The government uses privatization policy to ensure 
allocative efficiency of resources, but also to take care of laid off workers, and fill in 
the gaps in the budget, which is meant to help it win political points. 
 
That the Serbian government does try to accomplish manifold goals with one policy 
can be seen from the example of the first tender sale. When the government sold the 
cement factory Novi Popovac, it was sold to the Swiss Holcim that offered $52.5 
million, although the Greece Titan offered $67.9. The tender commission justified its 
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decision by referring to another relevant criteria for tender sale —namely, the level of 
new investments. Holcim offered $83.9 million of investment, whereas Titan offered 
only $26.6 million. 
 
In order to calculate the total offer, the government applies the method of weighting. 
Suppose that the formula implies that the cash is valued at 100% and investment 
promises at 66% (social program is not factored in). A very simplified calculation in 
the case of the Novi Popovac could have looked like this: 
 
Holcim: 52.2 cash + 83.9 investments (x 66% = 55.4) = 107.9 total 
Titan: 67.9 cash + 26.6 investments (x 66% = 17.6) = 85.5 total 
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Appendix 
 
Tender sales by mid-March 2003 
Name of 
factory 
Line of 
business 
Name of 
strategic 
partner 
Final 
price in 
mil. $ 
Percent 
of capital 
privatized 
Obliged 
to invest 
in mil. $ 
Sale 
closed 
on 
Beocin Cement 
production 
Lafarge, 
France 
50.9 70% 32.3 1/29/01 
Kosijeric Cement 
production 
Titan, 
Greece 
35.5  70% 29.6 1/30/01 
Novi 
Popovac 
Cement 
production 
Holcim, 
Switzerland 
52.5 70% 83.9 1/30/01 
Seval, 
Sevojno 
Aluminium 
processing 
Impol, 
Slovenia 
7.5 70% 14.5 8/27/02 
Merima, 
Krusevac 
Household 
consumables 
Henkel, 
Germany 
14.4 70% 43.1 8/28/02 
TOTAL   160  203  
Table 11 
 
 
Auction sales by mid-March 2003. 
Name and site of 
firm  
No of 
employ
ed 
Line of business Price 
(in 
$000) 
Price (in 
000 YuD) 
Buyer Date of 
sale 
Autoservis, 
Priboj 
43 Maintenance and 
repairment of cars 
 2,352   
Elgrakop Plc, 
Ljig 
63 Colours production  14,625   
Ornament, 
Subotica 
47 Façade making  5,796   
Diork, 
Kragujevac 
363 Clothes making  13,610   
Golubac, Arilje 76 Hotel menagement  29,019   
Loznica, Loznica 9 Fruits and vegetables  190   
Montaža, 
Beograd 
521 Construction  34,864   
Zlatibor, 
Cajetina 
132 Production of milk, 
meat, and eggs 
 66,640   
Neimar, Valjevo 22 Construction 
materials 
 316   
Zorka-boje, 
Šabac 
177 Chemical industry  232,530   
Hladnjaca, 
Ljubovija 
51 Fruits and veget ables 
deep freezing 
 18,048   
Palisad, Cajetina 164 Retail and wholesale  47,769   
Kijevo, Beograd 78 Stone exploitation  55,048   
Grada, Beograd 16 Trade  11,562   
Metalservis, 
Smederevo 
31 Trade  2,952   
Remont, Becej 80 Maintenance of motor 
vehicles 
 7,636   
Standard, Novi 
Sad 
92 Bags  29,024   
Granit, Ljubovija 65 Stonebreaking  50,336   
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Milivoj Lazin, B. 
Arandelovo 
65 Agriculture products  41,373   
Metalac, 
Kladovo 
11 Making of metal 
construction 
 6,322   
Riboteks, 
Ljubovija 
16 Fishpooling  18,681   
Iverak, Valjevo 56 Metal hardware  10,368   
Jugoremedija, 
Zrenjanin 
   960,000 AD Jaka 80 
Radovis, 
Macedonia 
9/10/02 
IGM Ruma, 
Ruma 
2138 Pharmaceutical raw 
materials 
 66,918 Zivorad 
Pantic 
9/10/02 
AD 
Macvapromet, 
Sabac 
53 Refregenerating and 
processing of fruit 
and vegatables 
 2,240 DOO 
Viktorija 3.S 
9/10/02 
Laminat, Bajina 
Basta 
82 Laminat and 
paperboards 
 7,298 Borivoje 
Skoric 
9/10/02 
DP Progres 332 Production of 
furniture and wood 
processing 
 17,060 MPS 
Marketing 
Tim 
9/10/02 
DP Buducnost, 
Sremski 
Karlovci 
57 Clothes 
manufacturing 
 3,325 DOO 
Pansped 
9/10/02 
Dimnicar, Kula 14 Chimney services  176 Gordana 
Koprivica 
9/27/02 
Progres, Bela 
Crkva 
48 Wholesale  1,365 Radivoje 
Stojicic 
9/27/02 
Instalacije, Novi 
Sad 
26 Construction 
installations 
 1,179 Radoslav 
Djuricic 
9/27/02 
Dekor, Sabac 128 Construction, final 
works 
 52,000 Milisav 
Teodorovic 
5/10/02 
Nebojsa 
Jerkovic, Sabac 
63 Furniture  4,000 Zoran 
Filipovic 
5/10/02 
Proteinka, Sabac 57 Lived stock feeds  21,238 Dejan 
Tufegdzic 
5/10/02 
Podunavlje, 
Golubac 
29 Wholesale and retail 
trade 
 7,210 Borisav 
Jovanovic 
5/10/02 
Ozren, 
Pozarevac 
32 Wholesale and retail 
trade 
 3,000 Nebojsa 
Zivanovic 
5/10/02 
Standard, 
Leskovac 
105 Finalization works in 
construction 
 16,500 Metodije 
Jovanovic 
5/10/02 
Metal, 
Obrenovac 
32 Finalization works in 
construction 
 422 Milisav 
Kasratovic 
5/10/02 
Mesar, Uzice 70 Fresh meat  4,560 Srbija- 
Mond 
5/10/02 
Knjigovodstveni 
Centar, Sombor 
12 Accounting services  25.374 Jovan Brkic 5/10/02 
       
       
       
TOTAL    622,000   
Table 11. 
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